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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks are vulnerable to adversar-
ial attacks even in settings where the attacker has
no direct access to the model being attacked. Such
attacks usually rely on the principle of transfer-
ability, whereby an attack crafted on a surrogate
model tends to transfer to the target model. We
show that an ensemble of models with misaligned
loss gradients can provide an effective defense
against transfer-based attacks. Our key insight is
that an adversarial example is less likely to fool
multiple models in the ensemble if their loss func-
tions do not increase in a correlated fashion. To
this end, we propose Diversity Training, a novel
method to train an ensemble of models with uncor-
related loss functions. We show that our method
significantly improves the adversarial robustness
of ensembles and can also be combined with ex-
isting methods to create a stronger defense.
1. Introduction
Despite achieving state of the art classification accuracies on
a wide variety of tasks, it has been demonstrated that deep
neural networks can be fooled into misclassifying an input
that has been adversarially perturbed (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2015). These adversarial perturbations
are small enough to go unnoticed by humans but can reliably
fool deep neural networks. The existence of adversarial
inputs presents a security vulnerability in the deployment
of deep neural networks for real world applications such as
self-driving cars, online content moderation and malware
detection. It is important to ensure that the models used in
these applications are robust to adversarial inputs as failure
to do so can have severe consequences ranging from loss in
revenue to loss of lives.
A number of attacks have been proposed which use the
gradient information of the model to figure out the pertur-
bations to a benign input that would make it adversarial.
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These attacks require access to the model parameters and
are termed white-box attacks. Fortunately, several real world
applications of deep learning do not expose the model pa-
rameters to the end user, making it harder for an adversary
to attack the model. However, adversarial examples have
been shown to transfer across different models (Papernot
et al., 2016a), enabling adversarial attacks without knowl-
edge of the model architecture or parameters. Attacks that
work under these constraints are termed black-box attacks.
1.1. Transferability
Black-box attacks rely on the principle of transferability.
In the absence of access to the target model, the adversary
trains a surrogate model and crafts adversarial attacks on
this model using white-box attacks. Adversarial examples
generated this way can be used to fool the target model with
a high probability of success (Liu et al., 2016). Adversar-
ial examples have been known to span a large contiguous
subspace of the input (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Further-
more, recent work explaining transferability (Tramr et al.,
2017) has shown that models with high dimensionality of
adversarial subspace (Adv-SS) are more likely to intersect,
causing adversarial examples to transfer between models.
Our goal is to find an effective way to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the Adv-SS and hence reduce transferability of
adversarial examples. We show that this can be done by
using an ensemble of diversely trained models.
1.2. Ensemble as an Effective Defense
An ensemble uses a collection of different models and aggre-
gates their outputs for classification. Adversarial robustness
can potentially be improved using an ensemble, as the at-
tack vector must now fool multiple models in the ensemble
instead of just a single model. In other words, the attack
vector must now lie in the shared Adv-SS of the models in
the ensemble. We explain this using the Venn diagrams in
Figure 1. The area enclosed by the rectangle represents a
set of orthogonal perturbations spanning the space of the
input and the circle represents the subset of these orthogonal
perturbations that are adversarial (i.e. cause the model to
misclassify the input). The shaded region represents the
Adv-SS. For a single model (Figure 1a), any perturbation
that lies in the subspace defined by the circle would cause
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Figure 1. Venn diagram illustrations of the adversarial subspace of (a) single model (b) Ensemble of 3 models and (c) Diverse Ensemble.
Our goal is to reduce the overlap in the adversarial subspaces of the models in the ensemble as shown in (c)
the model to misclassify the input. In contrast, for an ensem-
ble of 3 models, the adversarial input must fool more than
one model in the ensemble for the attack to be successful.
This implies that the attack vector must lie in the shared
Adv-SS of the ensemble as shown in Figure 1b.
While prior works have used ensemble of models in various
forms to defend against adversarial attacks (Liu et al., 2017;
Strauss et al., 2018), we show that the efficacy of ensem-
bles can be improved significantly by explicitly forcing a
reduction in the shared Adv-SS of the models as shown in
Figure 1c. Reducing this overlap translates to a reduction in
the overall dimensionality of the Adv-SS of the ensemble.
Thus, there are fewer directions of adversarial perturbations
that can cause multiple models in the ensemble to misclas-
sify, resulting in a reduction of transferability and improved
adversarial robustness.
1.3. Contributions
We study the use of ensembles in the context of black-box
attacks and propose a technique to improve adversarial ro-
bustness. Overall, we make the following key contributions:
1. We identify that the adversarial robustness of an ensem-
ble can be improved by reducing the dimensionality of
the shared adversarial subspace
2. We propose Gradient Alignment Loss(GAL), a met-
ric to measure the shared adversarial subspace of the
models in an ensemble.
3. We show that GAL can be used as a regularizer to train
an ensemble of diverse models with misaligned loss
gradients. We call this Diversity Training.
4. We show empirically that Diversity Training makes
ensembles more robust to transfer-based attacks.
2. Background
In this section we formally define the attack model and
describe the various attacks considered in our work.
2.1. Adversarial Examples
A benign input x can be transformed into an adversarial
input x′ by adding a carefully crafted perturbation η
x′ = x+ η (1)
For an untargeted attack, the adversary’s objective is to
cause the model f to misclassify the perturbed input such
that f(x′) 6= ytrue, where ytrue is the ground-truth label of
x. However, this perturbation must not result in a perceiv-
able change to the input for a human observer. Following
prior work on adversarial machine learning for image clas-
sification (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017), we
enforce this constraint by restricting the l∞ norm of the
perturbation to be below a threshold  i.e. ‖η‖∞ ≤ .
2.2. Black-Box Attack Model
This work considers the black-box attack model in which
the attacker does not know the parameters of the target
model. We assume however that the adversary has access
to the dataset used for training and knows the architecture
of the model being attacked. To attack a target model T
trained on dataset D, the adversary trains a surrogate model
S using the same dataset. Adversarial examples crafted on
the surrogate model using white-box attacks can be used to
attack the target model using the principle of transferability.
We briefly describe the various attack algorithms considered
in our evaluations that can be used for this purpose.
2.3. Attack Algorithms
Given full access to the model parameters, the adversary can
craft an adversarial example by considering the loss function.
Improving Adversarial Robustness of Ensembles with Diversity Training
Let J(θ, x, y) denote the loss function of the model f , where
θ represents the model parameters, x is the benign input
and y is the label. The attacker’s goal is to generate an
adversarial example x′ with the objective of maximizing
the model’s loss function, such that J(θ, x′, y) > J(θ, x, y),
while adhering to the constraint: ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ . Several
techniques have been proposed in literature to solve this
constrained optimization problem. We discuss the ones
used in the evaluation of our defense.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): FGSM (Goodfel-
low et al., 2015) uses a linear approximation of the loss
function to find an adversarial perturbation that causes the
loss function to increase. Let ∇xJ(θ, x, y) denote the gra-
dient of the loss function with respect to x. The input is
modified by adding a perturbation of size  in the direction
of the gradient vector.
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)) (2)
Several variants of FGSM have been proposed in recent
literature with the goal of improving the effectiveness of the
perturbation in increasing the loss function.
Random Step-FGSM (R-FGSM): This method proposes
to take a single random step followed by the application
of FGSM. (Trame`r et al., 2017) hypothesized that the loss
function tends to be non-smooth near data points. Thus,
taking a random step before applying FGSM should improve
the quality of the gradient.
Iterative-FGSM (I-FGSM): Instead of taking just one step
in the direction of the gradient, (Kurakin et al., 2016) pro-
posed taking multiple smaller steps (k steps of size /k)
with gradient being computed after each step.
gt = ∇xJ(θ, x′t, y) (3)
x′0 = x, x
′
t+1 = x
′
t + (/k) · sign(gt) (4)
Momentum Iterative-FGSM (MI-FGSM): (Dong et al.,
2017) observed that Iterative-FGSM can be improved to
avoid poor local minima by considering the momentum
information of gradient. They propose MI-FGSM which
uses an exponential moving average of the gradient (i.e.
momentum) to compute the direction of perturbation in
each iteration.
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ(θ, x
′
t, y)
‖∇xJ(θ, x′t, y)‖1
(5)
µ is the decay factor used to compute the moving average
of the gradients. x′t+1 is computed as shown in Eqn.(4).
This attack won the first place in the NIPS 2017 adversarial
attack competition.
PGD-CW: This is a variant of the I-FGSM attack with
the hinge loss function suggested by (Carlini & Wagner,
2016). Similar to (Madry et al., 2017), we use Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) to maximize the loss function,
which ensures that the attacked image lies within the l∞
ball around the natural image.
3. Diversity Training
3.1. Approach
The goal of our work is to improve the adversarial robustness
of the model to black-box attacks by reducing the transfer-
ability of adversarial examples. This can be achieved by
reducing the dimensionality of the Adv-SS of the target
model using an ensemble of diverse models. Our approach
to training an ensemble of diverse models is as follows:
1. Find a way to measure the dimensionality of Adv-SS
of the ensemble
2. Use this measure as a regularization term to train an
ensemble of diverse models.
The rest of this section describes the two parts of our solu-
tion in greater detail.
3.2. Measuring Adversarial Subspaces
Adversarial examples have been known to span a contiguous
subspace of the input. Several methods such as Gradient
Aligned Adversarial Subspace (Tramr et al., 2017) and
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (Ma et al., 2018) have been
proposed in recent literature to measure the dimensionality
of this subspace. Unfortunately, these methods cannot be
used in the cost function during training as computing them
is either expensive or involves the use of non-differentiable
functions. For our purposes, we want a computationally
inexpensive way of measuring the dimensionality of Adv-
SS using a differentiable function. This would allow us to
run backpropagation through the function and use it as a
regularization term during training.
3.2.1. ADV-SS OF AN ENSEMBLE
Our proposal is to use an ensemble of models and thus we
are interested in measuring the Adv-SS of the ensemble
instead of a single model. For an input to be adversarial,
it has to fool multiple models in the ensemble, requiring
the example to lie in the shared Adv-SS of multiple models
as shown in Figure 1b. Thus, the overall dimensionality of
the Adv-SS of an ensemble is proportional to the amount of
overlap in the Adv-SS of the individual models. We propose
a novel method to measure this overlap by considering the
alignment of the loss gradient vectors of the models.
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Figure 2. Illustration showing the relationship between the gradient alignment and overlap of adversarial subspaces of two models.
Misaligned gradients indicate a smaller overlap in the adversarial subspace.
3.2.2. GRADIENT ALIGNMENT
We first describe how the overlap of Adv-SS can be mea-
sured between two models and then show that our idea can
be generalized to an ensemble of N models. Consider two
models f0 and f1. Let ∇xJ0(θ0, x, y) and ∇xJ1(θ1, x, y)
denote the gradient of the loss functions of the two models
with respect to the input x.
The gradient describes the direction in which the input x
has to be perturbed to maximally increase the loss function
(locally around x). If the gradients of the two models are
aligned, their loss functions increase in a correlated fashion,
which means that a perturbation that causes J0 to increase
would likely also cause J1 to increase. This indicates that
the two models have similar adversarial directions and hence
have a large shared Adv-SS as shown in Figure 2a. In other
words, adversarial examples that fool f0 are also likely to
fool f1. Conversely, if the gradients of the two models are
misaligned, the perturbations that cause J0 to increase do
not cause J1 to increase. Thus f0 and f1 are unlikely to be
fooled by the same perturbations implying that there is a
reduction in the dimensionality of the shared Adv-SS of the
two models as illustrated in Figure 2b.
Thus, alignment of gradients can be used as a proxy to
measure the amount of overlap in the Adv-SS of two models.
A straightforward way to measure the alignment of gradients
is to compute the cosine similarity (CS) between them.
CS(∇xJ0,∇xJ1) = < ∇xJ0,∇xJ1 >|∇xJ0| · |∇xJ1| (6)
Cosine similarity has values in the range [−1,+1]. For two
models, we would ideally like the cosine similarity to be -1
so that the gradients are completely misaligned and there
is no overlap in the adversarial subspaces between the two
models. For an ensemble of N models, we want the set of
N gradient vectors {∇xJi}Ni=1 to be maximally misaligned.
One way of measuring the amount of alignment for a set
of vectors is by considering their coherence value (Tropp,
2006). Coherence measures the maximum cosine similar-
ity between unique pairs of vectors in the set. We define
coherence as shown in Eqn. 7.
coherence
({∇xJi}Ni=1) = max
a,b∈{1,..,N}
a6=b
CS(∇xJa,∇xJb)
(7)
Coherence can be computed by taking the pairwise cosine
similarity with vectors in {∇xJi}Ni=1 and considering the
max over all the cosine similarity terms. Since this is a
non-smooth function, minimizing Eqn. 7 using first order
methods like gradient descent would be slow. The rate of
convergence can be improved by using a smooth approxi-
mation of this function (Nesterov, 2005). We replace max
in Eqn. 7 with LogSumExp as shown in Eqn. 8.
GAL = log
( ∑
1≤a<b≤N
exp(CS(∇xJa,∇xJb))
)
(8)
We call this term the Gradient Alignment Loss (GAL). GAL
can be used to approximate coherence and hence provides a
way to measure the degree of overlap in the Adv-SS of the
models in the ensemble.
3.3. Diversity Training
If the models in an ensemble have a low GAL value for input
x, it becomes harder to generate an adversarial example x′
that fool multiple models . We call such a collection of
models with low GAL value a diverse ensemble. In order to
encourage ensembles to have low GAL, we propose using it
as part of the cost function during training as a regularization
term. We term this training procedure Diversity Training
(DivTrain). Eqn. 9 shows the modified loss function.
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Loss =
1
N
N∑
i=1
J(θi, x, ytrue) + λ.GAL (9)
The first term is the average cross entropy (CE) loss of each
model in the ensemble and the second term represents the
GAL. λ is a hyperparameter that controls the importance
given to GAL during training i.e. a large value of λ would
improve adversarial robustness at the cost of clean accu-
racy. DivTrain lowers the dimensionality of the Adv-SS of
the ensemble by reducing the overlap in the Adv-SS of the
individual models. This reduces the transferability of adver-
sarial examples and improves the adversarial robustness of
the target model.
3.4. Problem of Sparse Gradients
The selection of the activation function is an important
design choice for the effective training of the network
with GAL regularization. Using ReLu non-linearity in
our networks, for example, causes the loss-gradient vector
∇xJ(θ, x, y) to have a large number of zero values. This is
because the derivative of the ReLu activation is zero valued
in the saturating regime of the input (x < 0) as shown in
Figure 3a. Since computing the GAL involves taking the in-
ner product of∇xJ terms, we end up with a large number of
zero-valued product terms. This poses a problem for back-
propagation since gradients don’t flow through zero-valued
products, causing the gradients to vanish and preventing
the network from being trained. Our solution is to use an
activation function which does not suffer from this problem
like Leaky-ReLu instead. Leaky-Relu (Figure 3b) has the
desirable property of having a non zero gradient value re-
gardless of the value of the input. This reduces the sparsity
of the loss-gradient vector and improves the effectiveness
of GAL regularization.
Sparsity of ∇ J
Reduces Vanishing Gradients Problem
f'=0
f'=1
f'=0.1
f'=1
x x
f(x) f(x)
Sparsity of ∇ J
Gradients through GAL vanish
during backprop
(a) ReLu (b) Leaky ReLu
Figure 3. Leaky Relu improves backpropagation through GAL by
reducing the sparsity of the Gradient Vector
4. Experiments
We conduct experiments using the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets to validate our claims of improved robustness to
transfer-based black-box attacks with DivTrain. We start by
describing our experimental setup in Section 4.1. Experi-
mental results, including evaluations of combining DivTrain
with the existing state of the art black-box defense is pre-
sented in Section 4.2. We compare the distributions of
coherence values between diverse and baseline ensembles
in Section 4.3. Finally, we provide results for the Gradient
Aligned Adversarial Subspace analysis in Section 4.4 and
show that DivTrain reduces the dimensionality of adversar-
ial subspace of the ensemble.
4.1. Setup
Our experiments evaluate the robustness of a Target model
T to black-box attacks. The attack is carried out by conduct-
ing white-box attacks on a Surrogate model S and checking
the accuracy of the adversarial examples generated in this
way on T . We assume that the adversary has knowledge of
the network architecture and the dataset used to train T but
not its model parameters. Hence, in our evaluations, we use
models trained separately on the same dataset and having
the same network architecture for T and S. We evaluate the
effectiveness of DivTrain by comparing the adversarial ro-
bustness between a baseline ensemble (TBase) trained with
CE loss, without any regularization and a Diverse Ensemble
(TDiv) trained with GAL regularization. An ensemble with
5 models is used for both the target and surrogate model.
We found that using an ensemble as a surrogate produced
more transferable adversarial examples as compared to a
single model. This is in line with the observations made by
(Dong et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016).
Table 1. Structure of the models used in our evaluations
MODEL STRUCTURE
CONV-3 C32-C64-M-C128-M-FC1024-FC10
CONV-4 C32-C64-C128-M-C128-M-FC1024-
FC10
RESNET-20 C16 - 3X{RES16-RES32-RES64} - FC10
RESNET-26 C16 - 4X{RES16-RES32-RES64} - FC10
Network Configuration: Table 1 lists the structure of the
models used in our experiments. We use neural networks
consisting of Convolutional(C), Max-pooling (M) and Fully
Connected (FC) layers. The Conv networks have 3 × 3
Convolutional layers and 2 × 2 max-pooling layers. The
ResNet structure is similar to the one described in (He et al.,
2016). The network has total of 6n + 2 layers consisting
of Residual blocks (RES) with skip connections after every
two layers. Leaky-Relu is used as the non-linearity after
each convolutional layer for all the networks.
The models are trained using the Adam optimizer (Kingma
& Ba, 2014) with a learning rate of 0.001. From our training
dataset D, we dynamically generate a augmented dataset D′
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Table 2. Classification accuracy of models under various black-box attacks comparing 1. Baseline-Ensemble (TBase) 2. Diverse-Ensemble
(TDiv) 3. EnsAdvTrain (TEns) and 4. EnsAdvTrain + DivTrain defense (TEns+Div). We use  = 0.1/0.3 for MNIST and  = 0.03/0.09
for CIFAR-10. The most successful attack for each perturbation size is highlighted in bold. TDiv improves adversarial robustness over
TBase. The combined defense TEns+Div is more robust compared to the individual defenses (TEns / TDiv).
MODEL TARGET(T) CLEAN FGSM R-FGSM I-FGSM MI-FGSM PGD-CW
CONV-3
(MNIST)
TBase 99.4 91.4 / 9.7 92.0 / 9.7 86.1 / 0.7 85.7 / 2.6 92.3 / 9.7
TDiv 99.2 97.1 / 34.3 97.8 / 30.6 97.6 / 20.4 96.9 / 16.9 97.1 / 35.9
TEns 99.4 98.9 / 61.3 99.0 / 42.5 99.0 / 56.3 98.8 / 45.9 98.8 / 44.8
TEns+Div 99.3 98.9 / 73.7 99.0 / 79.3 99.0 / 87.0 98.8 / 61.4 98.2 / 71.3
CONV-4
(CIFAR-10)
TBase 85.1 14.1 / 7.8 16.8 / 3.2 9.5 / 2.8 9.0 / 7.4 8.8 / 5.9
TDiv 82.4 45.3 / 14.7 56.0 / 15.1 51.4 / 5.6 35.0 / 7.5 43.9 / 11.6
TEns 82.9 64.6 / 43.2 70.5 / 54.9 69.4 / 54.3 59.9 / 38.6 62.1 / 42.8
TEns+Div 80.5 68.5 / 54.2 72.0 / 66.7 72.4 / 66.3 66.9 / 55.4 66.9 / 54.3
RESNET-20
(CIFAR-10)
TBase 88.9 28.8 / 13.1 25.7 / 7.1 8.6 / 3.2 10.2 / 6.3 18.7 / 10.2
TDiv 84.0 58.4 / 32.4 64.3 / 23.9 67.7 / 44.2 50.0 / 11.7 53.2 / 25.4
TEns 87.9 70.9 / 44.3 77.2 / 50.9 79.6 / 65.5 66.5 / 30.5 65.9 / 37.8
TEns+Div 84.7 74.9 / 50.7 78.1 / 57.6 79.7 / 71.5 74.1 / 47.4 71.3 / 46.3
MIX
(CIFAR-10)
TBase 89.7 27.9 / 9.6 30.9 / 6.1 13.9 / 3.1 10.6 / 5.9 26.0 / 7.6
TDiv 88.2 55.8 / 23.2 65.1 / 25.0 61.8 / 19.7 42.4 / 7.1 55.9 / 22.2
TEns 87.4 72.6 / 49.6 76.9 / 58.4 77.1 / 61.4 66.9 / 27.9 70.0 / 47.1
TEns+Div 86.4 73.4 / 52.2 77.9 / 64.1 77.2 / 67.5 69.2 / 39.7 71.8 / 50.4
using random shifts and crops for MNIST and random shifts,
flips and crops for CIFAR-10. In addition, we generate
a dataset Dnoise by adding a perturbation drawn from a
truncated normal distribution: N (µ = 0, σ = /2) to the
images in D with  = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 0.09 for
CIFAR-10. The combined dataset {D′,Dnoise} is used
to train diverse ensembles. We care about reducing the
coherence of {∇xJi}Ni=1 primarily around natural images.
Adding Gaussian noise to the training images allows us to
sample from a distribution that covers our region of interest
in the input space.
Conv-3 is trained for 10 epochs on MNIST dataset. Conv-4
and Resnet-20 are trained for 20 and 40 epochs respectively
on CIFAR-10. In addition, we also evaluate our defense
with an ensemble consisting of mixture of different model
architectures. The MIX ensemble is made up of {Resnet-
26, Resnet-20, Conv-4, Conv-3, Conv-3} and is trained on
CIFAR-10. We set λ = 0.5 for DivTrain (Equation 9) as
we empirically found this to offer a good trade-off between
clean accuracy and adversarial robustness.
Attack Configuration: We evaluate the accuracy of the
target models (TBase, TDiv) for clean examples as well as
adversarial examples crafted from black-box attacks using
the attacks described in Section 2.3 on Surrogate S. Since
S is an ensemble of 5 models, we consider the average CE
loss of all the models in S as the objective function to be
maximized for the attacks. We briefly describe the parame-
ters for each attack: FGSM takes a single step of magnitude
 in the direction of the gradient. R-FGSM applies FGSM
after taking a single random step sampled from a uniform
distribution: U(−,+). For I-FGSM and MI-FGSM, we
use k = 10 steps with each step of size /10. The decay
factor µ is set to 1.0 for MI-FGSM. We evaluate PGD-CW
with a confidence parameter k = 50 and 30 iterations of op-
timization considering the hinge-loss function from (Carlini
& Wagner, 2016). Results are reported for two different per-
turbation sizes for all the attacks:  = 0.1/0.3 for MNIST
and  = 0.03/0.09 for CIFAR-10. We use the Cleverhans li-
brary’s (Papernot et al., 2018) implementation of the attacks
to evaluate our defense.
4.2. Results
Our results comparing Baseline-Ensemble (TBase) and
Diverse-Ensemble (TDiv) are shown in Table 2 with the
most effective attack highlighted in bold. TDiv has a sig-
nificantly higher classification accuracy on adversarial ex-
amples compared to TBase for all the attacks considered,
showing that DivTrain improves the adversarial robustness
of ensembles against black-box attacks. The classification
accuracy of clean examples drops slightly as a consequence
of adding the regularization term (GAL) to the cost function.
There are several defenses proposed in recent literature to
defend against black-box attacks. Since DivTrain is a de-
fense that is generally applicable to any ensemble of mod-
els, it can be combined with existing proposals to create a
stronger defense. We show that this is possible by evaluating
a combination of our method with Ensemble Adversarial
Training (Trame`r et al., 2017) , which is the current state of
the art method for Black box defense.
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Figure 4. Histogram of Coherence values plotted for Conv-3, Conv-4 and Resnet-20 comparing TBase, TDiv , TEns and TEns+Div .
Models trained with Diversity Training (GAL regularization) have misaligned gradient vectors with lower coherence values.
Combined Defense: Ensemble Adversarial Training (En-
sAdvTrain ) proposes to improve adversarial robustness by
augmenting the training dataset with adversarial examples
generated from a static pre-trained model. We use a pre-
trained model with the same architecture as the target model.
By attacking the pre-trained model with FGSM, we generate
an adversarial dataset Dadv. The target models are trained
on the combined dataset consisting of both clean and ad-
versarial examples {D′,Dadv}. Perturbation sizes used to
generate the adversarial examples are randomly determined
from a truncated normal distribution N (µ = 0, σ = /2) to
ensure adversarial robustness against various perturbation
sizes as suggested by (Kurakin et al., 2016).
We denote the ensemble trained with EnsAdvTrain as TEns
and the ensemble trained with the combination of EnsAd-
vTrain and DivTrain as TEns+Div. Results showing the
classification accuracy of TEns and TEns+Div under vari-
ous attacks are provided in Table 2. The combined defense
offers higher classification accuracy under attack compared
with either of the two defenses TEns/TDiv used alone. This
shows that DivTrain can be combined with existing methods
such as EnsAdvTrain to create a stronger defense.
4.3. Distribution of Coherence
Diversity Training encourages models to have uncorrelated
loss functions by reducing the coherence among their gradi-
ent vectors. Figure 4 compares the distribution of coherence
values (see Eqn. 7) for the different target models used in our
evaluations. The histograms show that TDiv and TEns+Div
have lower coherence values compared to TBase and TEns.
Thus, our proposed GAL regularization is an effective way
of training models with misaligned gradient vectors which
can be used to create ensembles with improved adversarial
robustness to black-box attacks.
4.4. Gradient Aligned Adversarial Subspace
We provide further evidence that DivTrain lowers the di-
mensionality of the Adv-SS of the ensemble by using the
Gradient Aligned Adversarial Subspace (GAAS) (Tramr
et al., 2017) analysis. GAAS measures the dimensionality of
the Adv-SS by aligning a set of k orthogonal vectors {ri}ki=1
with the gradient of the loss function∇xJ(θ, x, y) in order
to find a maximal set of orthogonal adversarial perturbations.
The orthogonal vectors are constructed by multiplying the
row vectors from a Regular Hadamard matrix component-
wise with sign(∇xJ). For a Regular Hadamard matrix of
order k, this yields a set of k orthogonal vectors aligned
with the gradient. We run the GAAS analysis on the Conv-4
model and use k ∈ {4, 25, 36, 64}. Figure 5 compares the
probability of finding successful orthogonal directions for
TBase and TDiv. We repeat the analysis with different per-
turbation sizes ( = 0.03/0.06/0.09). Our results show that
TDiv has fewer orthogonal adversarial directions compared
to TBase showing that DivTrain can effectively lower the
dimensionality of the Adv-SS of ensembles.
5. Related Work
The susceptibility of deep neural networks to adversarial
inputs has sparked considerable research interest in finding
ways to make deep learning models robust to adversarial
attacks. As a result, a number of methods have been pro-
posed to defend against white-box attacks (Papernot et al.,
2015; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Na et al., 2017; Buckman
et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018; Dhillon et al.,
2018; Xie et al., 2018; Song et al., 2017; Samangouei et al.,
2018). However, a fair majority of these defenses have been
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Figure 5. Gradient aligned adversarial subspace analysis performed on Conv-4 with CIFAR-10. Plots show the probability of finding k
orthogonal adversarial directions for 3 different perturbation sizes  = 0.03/0.06/0.09. TDiv has consistently lower probabilities of
finding an adversarial direction compared to TBase showing that DivTrain lowers the dimensionality of the Adv-SS of an ensemble.
shown to be ineffective against adaptive attacks that are
tailor-made to work well against specific defenses. A recent
work (Athalye et al., 2018) showed that a number of these
attacks rely on some form of gradient masking (Papernot
et al., 2016b), whereby the defense makes the gradient infor-
mation unavailable to the attacker, making it harder to craft
adversarial examples. It also proposes techniques to tackle
the problem of obfuscated gradients that break defenses
which use gradient masking.
Prior works have considered the use of ensembles to im-
prove adversarial robustness. (Strauss et al., 2018) use en-
sembles with the intuition that adversarial examples that
lead to misclassification in one model may not fool other
models in the ensemble. (Liu et al., 2017) use noise injec-
tion to the layers of the neural network to prevent gradient
based attacks and ensembles predictions over random noises.
While both of these works benefit from the adversarial ro-
bustness offered by ensembles as discussed in Section 1.2,
the contribution of our work is to further improve this robust-
ness by explicitly encouraging the models in the ensemble
to have uncorrelated loss functions.
The idea of using cosine similarity of gradients to measure
the correlation between loss functions has been explored
in (Du et al., 2018). This was used in the context of im-
proving the usefulness of auxiliary tasks to improve data
efficiency. In contrast, we develop a metric based on cosine
similarity that can measure the similarity among a set of gra-
dient vectors with the objective of measuring the overlap of
adversarial subspaces between the models in an ensemble.
6. Discussion
Our paper explores the use of diverse ensembles with uncor-
related loss functions to better defend against transfer-based
attacks. We briefly discuss other problem settings where our
idea can potentially be used.
Adversarial Attack Detection: The objective here is to
detect inputs that have been adversarially tampered with
and flag such inputs. A recent work (Bagnall et al., 2017)
uses ensembles to detect adversarial inputs by training them
to have high disagreement for inputs outside the training
distribution. Since GAL minimizes the coherence of gradi-
ent vectors, it can potentially be used for the same purpose.
One possible approach would be to use a modified version
of DivTrain which uses GAL as the cost function (without
cross-entropy loss) for examples outside the training dis-
tribution so that the consensus among the members of the
ensemble would be low for out-of-distribution data.
Better Black-Box Attacks: Ensembles can also be used
to generate better black-box attacks. (Dong et al., 2017;
Liu et al., 2016) use an ensemble of models as the surro-
gate with the intuition that adversarial examples that fool
multiple models tend to be more transferable. It would be in-
teresting to study the transferability of adversarial examples
generated on diverse-ensembles to see if they can enable
better black-box attacks. We leave the evaluation of both of
these ideas for a future work.
7. Conclusion
Transfer-based attacks present an important challenge for
the secure deployment of deep neural networks in real world
applications. We explore the use of ensembles to defend
against this class of attacks with the intuition that it is harder
to fool multiple models in an ensemble if they have uncorre-
lated loss functions. We propose a novel regularization term
called Gradient Alignment Loss that helps us train models
with uncorrelated loss function by minimizing the coher-
ence among their gradient vectors. We show that this can be
used to train a diverse ensemble with improved adversarial
robustness by reducing the amount of overlap in the shared
adversarial subspace of the models. Furthermore, our pro-
posal can be combined with existing methods to create a
stronger defense. We believe that reducing the dimension-
ality of the adversarial subspace is important to creating a
strong defense and Diversity Training is a technique that
can help achieve this goal.
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